




*Geographical, Historical,
Political, Philosophical and Mechanical*

E S S A Y S.
Number II. CONTAINING
A
L E T T E R,

*Representing the Impropriety of sending Forces to Virginia :
The Importance of taking Frontenac ;
And that the Preservation of Oswego was owing to
General Shirley's proceeding thither.*

Containing Objections to those Parts of *Evans's* General Map and Analysis,
which relate to the *French* Title to the Country, on the North-West
Side of *St. Laurence* River, between Fort *Frontenac* and *Montreal*, &c.

Published in the *New-York Mercury*, N^o 178. Jan. 5, 1756.

WITH AN
A N S W E R

To so much thereof as concerns the Public :
And the several Articles set in a just Light :

By *LEWIS EVANS*.

L O N D O N :
Printed for R. and J. DODSLEY in Pall-mall.
MDCCLVI.

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A

LETTER

Published in the *New-York Mercury*, January 5, 1756.

Mr. GAINÉ,

The following Letter from a Gentleman in *New-York*, to his Friend at *Philadelphia*, is upon a Subject of so much Importance, that I beg you'll give it a Place in your Paper.

S I R,

I Thank you for the Copy of Evans's Map of the Middle British Colonies. It shews in a very striking Point of Light, that the Virginia Solicitations for the Landing of the European Troops in that Colony, in order from thence to make a Descent upon Fort Du Quesne, were to the last Degree absurd, abstracted from their Fitness to serve the Interest of a private Company, at the Expence of the Welfare of the Public. Had General Braddock's Army succeeded in that Enterprize, it would, in my humble Opinion, have been a useless and untenable Acquisition; and therefore nothing could be more fortunate, than that Part of the Scheme for dividing the Troops, and General Shirley's proceeding to Oswego, by which Means that Garrison has been preserved from falling into the Hands of our Enemies; which but for his singular Precaution, would have been it's inevitable Fate. If we can maintain the Command of the Lake Ontario, the Forts at Presque Isle, Riviere Beuf, and that at Du Quesne, with all the other Encroachments on the Ohio, must necessarily fall, because the only remaining Rout from Canada, thro' the Outawais-River, the Lakes Huron and Erie, will be attended with insuperable Difficulties. But if the French are permitted to pass thro' the Lake Ontario, and to continue their Forts at La Gallette, Frontenac and Niagara, it will be impossible to preserve the Country, or the Fidelity of the Five Nations, or to defend the Frontiers of our South-western Colonies. This appears evident from all the Maps of the back Country; and if one may argue from the Vessels which General Shirley built last Summer upon the Lake, the Works erected at Oswego, and the strong Garrison left there this Winter, doubtless he considers the Possession of the Lands on both Sides of that Lake, and the compleat Command of it, as the grand Object which he ought to have in View. But nothing to Purpose can be done, without the Reduction of Frontenac, which commands the Entrance from Canada, and is distant about 180 Miles from Montreal. Considering the Matter in this Light, I was extremely surprised to find the Author of the Map you sent me, endeavouring to obstruct the Attempt upon Frontenac, by putting in a Claim to it, on the Behalf

A LETTER published in the New-York Mercury, January 5, 1756.

of his most Christian Majesty. For, besides the Colouring in the Map, the Author in a Pamphlet, or Analysis, which accompanies it, tells us, that "the French being in Possession of Fort Frontenac, at the Peace of Ryswick, which they attained during their War with the Confederates, gives them an undoubted Title to the Acquisition of the North-west Side of St. Lawrence River, from thence to their Settlement at Montreal. But the Confederates still preserved their Right to the other Side, fully to Lake St. Francis, leaving the Rest to Montreal as a Boundary."

This Pamphlet is intitled, Geographical, Historical, and POLITICAL Essays, &c. and doubtless the French King is much obliged to the Author, for this reasonable Specimen of his Politics. For thousands who observe this Passage in his Analysis, may take the Doctrine for an incontestable Truth, and thro' an Indolence, common to most Men, spare themselves the Trouble of examining the Treaty of Ryswick, which would give the Inquirer as indifferent an Opinion of Mr. Evans's Talent at Reasoning, as we ought to have of this his POLITICAL Tenet. All that the Treaty contains, that can be thought to be in the least Degree applicable to the Matter now under Consideration, is in the VIIth Article, which is in these Words, "That the most Christian King shall restore to the King of Great-Britain, all Countries, Islands, Ports, and Colonies, where-soever situated, which the English did possess before the Declaration of the present War: And in like Manner the King of Great-Britain shall restore to the most Christian King, all Countries, Islands, Ports, and Colonies, where-soever situated, which the French did possess before the said Declaration of War: And this Restitution shall be made on both Sides, within the Space of six Months, or sooner, if it can be done."

Now upon the Supposition, that this Treaty has any Relation to the present Debate, and admitting, that the French attained the Fort at Frontenac during the War, the most obvious Conclusion is, that they ought by Virtue of this Treaty, to have restored it to the British Crown; and this Consequence appears to me so natural and necessary, that Mr. Evans, or the Gentleman who suggested this Hint to him, is under the strongest Obligations to his Majesty, and the Public, to make a Declaration of his Inducements to advance this extraordinary Doctrine, especially at such a Juncture as the present. Had Mr. Evans's Conclusion been founded upon a long Thread of Argument, all the World would in Charity suppose that he had fallen into an Error thro' Inattention; but to publish a Map, and assert in Print, in the most positive Terms, that the King of France has an undoubted Title to the very Lands, for the regaining of which his Majesty is now in Arms, and to found that Title upon a solemn Treaty, and yet suppress the Publication of the Articles relating to it; is a Piece of Conduct, for which I confess myself at a Loss to account. Certainly it has a most mischievous Tendency. The Bulk of Mankind are weak enough, to repose an implicit Faith in every Thing asserted in Print; and few but will take Mr. Evans's Word that Frontenac belongs to the French, especially as it is so strongly asserted, with a Reference to a Treaty for Proof, which one would presume must be plain, simple and express.

Should

A LETTER published in the New-York Mercury, January 5, 1756.

v

Should his Majesty's Orders to the General extend only to the Removal of Encroachments, without naming them in particular, no Man can tell how many of his Subjects may refuse to be concerned the next Campaign, in an Attempt upon Frontenac; which, according to this surprising Piece of Politics, would be unauthoritative and illegal, and of Consequence expose all who may be concerned in it to his Majesty's Resentment. We do not want Men of evil Designs, in some of our Colonies, at least, who would doubtless gladly improve Mr. Evans's Map, to serve a French Interest; and it is well known, that not long since a very respectable Body, unacquainted with his Majesty's Rights in America, or influenced by false Geographical Representations, seemed in Answer to a Message from one of our Governors, to doubt the Equity of our Claim to the very Lands on the Ohio, which even Mr. Evans himself has included in the Province of Pennsylvania. Other Consequences equally prejudicial to the British Interest, may attend the Dispersion of this Chart, and it's more mischievous Analysis, in Europe. The intestine Enemies of the Government, and all those who are disaffected to the present glorious and vigorous Measures of the Ministry, would not fail to make the worst Use of our Author's Doctrine, to stir up the Coals of Discontent in Great-Britain and Ireland; which the French, after our Example, would doubtless urge the Map as exclusive Evidence against our Right to the Lands on the North-side of the Iroquois River, which issues from the Lake, and falls into St. Lawrence at Montreal.


It is true indeed, the British Title to that Country can be established by the most irrefragable Arguments, founded on the solemn Decisions of the two Treaties of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle; but this hinders not the malignant Consequences I have mentioned, nor does it weaken the Obligations Mr. Evans lies under, to correct his Error; for I hope you have Reasons to think it deserves a Name no worse: and let me intreat you, SIR, to press him to do it with the utmost Dispatch. Nothing could be more unseasonable, than the Edition of his Map, in the present Situation of Affairs. And I could wish the respective Colonies, for the future, would pass a Law to restrain these Gentlemen, who divert themselves with setting Bounds to Provinces and Empires, till their Works have stood the Test of an accurate Examination, by Judges whose Capacity enables them, and whose Office may oblige them to give such Kind of Performances the severest Scrutiny. I believe you will agree with me, that this Map of Evans's affords the strongest Argument in favour of such a Regulation; for should the disputed Limits receive a Settlement according to that Gentleman's sage Opinion, and important Discoveries, these Colonies could never be secured against the Inruptions of the French, and must, in a short Process of Time, be entirely lost to Great-Britain.

I am, SIR,

1st Dec. 1755.

Your most humble Servant.

A N





A N
A N S W E R

*To so much of the foregoing LETTER as concerns
the Public, &c.*

The INTRODUCTION.

A Paper published in last Monday's *New-York Mercury*, being in a particular Manner directed to me, I am obliged, in Justice to my own Character, and for the Satisfaction of the Public, to give Answer to so much thereof, as relates to four Points.

1. WHETHER *the Virginia Solicitations for the landing the European Troops in that Colony, in order from thence to make a Descent upon Fort Du QUESNE, be not to the last Degree absurd*; which the Author asserts, upon the Authority of my Map; is true in itself, and agreeable to any Intimation of mine; or not.

2. WHETHER *the Preservation of Oswego was owing to General SHIRLEY'S proceeding thither*, as the Letter Writer asserts; is true or not.

3. WHETHER *Frontenac* is of the Importance the Author represents it; or not.

4. WHETHER a Passage in the Analysis of my General Map, which runs thus: "The *French* being in Possession of Fort *Frontenac* at the Peace of *Ryfwick*, which they attained during their War with the Confederates, gives them an undoubted Title to the Acquisition of the North-West Side of St. *Laurence* River, from thence to their Settlement at *Montreal*, †" † P. 14. is true, as I thought it was, or false, as this Author asserts.

I must premise an Apology, that as this Paper was published, when the Author knew I was in *New-York*, and of course must be destitute of the Papers and Books, necessary to carry on a Controversy so deeply founded as the latter Article, and the sudden Departure of a Ship now going to *England*, to carry the Charges against me, not admitting me time enough to go or
send

The Absurdity of sending BRITISH FORCES to VIRGINIA, answered.

send for them to *Philadelphia*; he thought it advisable thus to non-plus me, for the sake of damning my Credit, and imposing on People in *England* by these egregious Misrepresentations. But tho' I have not been able to borrow here any one public Paper necessary in the Dispute, but the Articles of the Peace of *Ryswick*; I hope however my Familiarity with the Affairs of *America*, and a few Notes I had casually by me, will be sufficient to set the Affair in a clear Light. And the Reader is desired to observe, that this Paper is only thrown out occasionally; and that the various Rights and Pretensions of the *English* and *French* to all this Country will be ready for the Press in a few Months. But as it would not be proper to intermix with what so immediately concerns the Public, any Replies to the personal Insults that the Author, from his superior Station, throws down upon me, which are worthy only of Ridicule, I shall not so far gratify him, as to make him the Reply he deserves, lest he have the Excuse he wants of *having Parties formed against him to impede his Designs*; and he is with so much Industry endeavouring to make. And as every Reader would not be sensible of the Necessity I am under of this Publication at this Time, I have prefixed the Paper which is the Cause of it—And were I to inform him, by whom it is ushered to the Public, he would imagine the Author would have had something else to do.

C H A P. I.

An Enquiry into the Propriety of sending British Forces to Virginia; the Consequences that have followed the ordering those to Albany that had been sent thither; and will follow, if not supplied.

The Letter
Writer represents the
Absurdity of
sending Forces
to Virginia.
Which wants
no Refutation.

§ p. 23 & 24.
By Virginia is
the only near
Passage to
Ohio.
The Portage
about 70
Miles,

THE Author of the Letter begins with saying, "That *Evans's* Map of the Middle *British* Colonies shews in a very striking Point of Light, that the *Virginia* Solicitations for the Landing of the *European* Troops in that Colony, in order from thence to make a Descent upon *Fort du Quesne*, were to the last Degree absurd." Let any Person look at the Map, and he will perceive that this wants no Refutation; because of the Nearness of that Fort to the Sea by that Way, and the vast Distance it is by any other; and none destitute of Woods, D-fles, and *Indian* Enemies. But let him look into the Analysis, § and he will find that there is but about seventy Miles Land Carriage between *Potomack* and the Branches of the *Ohio*. This Land Carriage begins at a Place, till of late pretty well settled by the *English*. *Potomack*, in all the Way from the *Falls* to *Wills Creek*, Spring and Fall, when the Water is high, or to the South Branch in dry Seasons, at the Head of an inland Navigation, has not in all the Way

Way so many bad Riffs as the *Mobocks* River has, from *Skeneclady* to *Fort Hunter*. This Part we yet are in Possession of; and were after *Brad-dock's* Defeat, and the Junction of the routed Party, with the Reserve under Col. *Dunbar*, of the Carrying-Place to the Waters of *Ohio*; being but 12 or 14 Miles to the Mouth of *Redstone Creek*, from whence to *Fort Du Quesne*, the fine River *Manaugabela* is 6 or 700 Feet wide, every where gentle and deep enough for Flats, which would carry any four Batteaux that can go on the *Mobocks* River with all their Loading.

which we were once Masters of,

This Author has let us into the Secret, at whose Instigations the Post on *Laurel Hill* was abdicated, and by that means have given to the *French* the Command of the Carrying-Place to our Rivers, instead of preserving to ourselves, while we were upon the Spot, the Passage to *Ohio* down easy Streams, by a Choice of two fine Rivers. Let me now enumerate the Consequences that have followed the drawing away from *Virginia* the Forces his Majesty had sent for its Protection, and the Recovery of the Lands our Enemies had usurped there. In the first Place; the *French*, as they had now nothing to fear on that Side, sent all the Forces they could so easily spare at *Du Quesne*, *Wenango* and *Presque Isle*, to improve and defend the Works at *Niagara*; which must have made that Post difficult to take, had our Forces on *Lake Ontario* been ready time enough, and sufficiently provided to attack it. 2dly, Whatever Hopes the *Welinis*, a League of Six powerful Nations *, who till then remained Masters of the lower Parts of *Ohio*, and were firmly attached to us, and in open War with the *French*, and obstructed their Passage that Way to *Du Quesne*, our abandoning the Frontiers of *Virginia* must have put them under a Necessity of submitting to the *French*; as they were at their Mercy, destitute of Arms, destitute of Ammunition, and past a Possibility of obtaining either. 3dly, The *Shawanese* till then on Terms of Civility with us, and the *Delawares* always attached to our Interest, and lately united with the *Wiandots*, on seeing themselves at the Mercy of the *French*, in their Habitations on *Ohio*, and connected with several of the *Indians* bordering on our Settlements, and some in the Heart of them, have all deserted our Interest, which they had not Strength to help, and now commit the most shocking Massacres and Waste on our Frontiers, all the Way from *Carolina* to *New-York*, to prove their Attachment to the *French* their new Allies. By this it appears, that all the *Indians* from *Albany*, South-Westerly to *Mississippi*, are lost by this Act in 4 or 5 Months Time. And this Author would fain prevent our recovering them by a new Attempt on that Side; and is making a Point of *Frontenac*, as if that were the sole Key to *Ohio*. To complete our Ruin on that Side, which is inevitable without Assistance from *England*, we have but the *Cherokees* and *Chicasaws* to lose. The former are now upon a Design of going to *Ohio*, which if they effect, their Loss is past Recovery. Let the Inclinations of the *Chicasaws* be afterwards ever so firm to our Nation, Necess-

and have since given to the *French*.

The bad Consequences which have followed the drawing away the British Forces from *Virginia*. *Niagara* better secured to the Enemy.

The *Welinis* lost. The *Shawanese*, *Delawares* and *Wiandots* go over to the *French*. And now ravage our Frontiers from *Carolina* to *New York*.

The Letter-Writer's Proposal is to prevent the *Indians* already lost; and to give up the *Cherokees* and *Chicasaws* yet remaining; which if effected, *Frontenac* will be of no Value, as the *French* will not want that Route to *Ohio*.

* The *Welinis*, called by the *French*, *Illinois*, consist of the *Tawightawis*, *Mineamis*, *Piancasawus*, *Warwaghtas*, *Piques* and *Kickkufes*.

sity must then compel them to support themselves by the good Fortune of the *French*. If that happen, which nothing can prevent, but Assistance on the *Virginia* Side from *England*, *Frontenac*, whether in the Hands of the *French* or the *English*, will be of no more Consequence than if it were under Water. To explain this to the Reader.

* p. 31.
The French
hitherto have
pretty equally
used *Mississippi*
and *St. Laurence*
to go to
Ohio.
St. Laurence
obstructed
with Ice: And
it's Entrance
exposed to the
English Ship-
ping.

3 Indian Na-
tions formerly
prevented the
French. 1 The
Welinis sub-
dued. 2 The
Cherokees wa-
vering. 3 The
Chicalaws
cannot stand
long unsup-
ported.

The Militia
cannot be rai-
sed in the
Southern Co-
lonies; and
why.

† p. 15:

The immense Value of the Country on the *Ohio* and its Branches has been explained in the Analysis.* The *French* hitherto, for going to that Country, have made pretty equal Use of the *Mississippi*, whose Mouth they are entire Masters of, and of *St. Laurence*, whose Navigation is commonly obstructed with Ice five or six Months in the Year. Adjacent to the Entrance of *St. Laurence*, the *English* are possessed of *Newfoundland* and *Nova-Scotia*, both furnished with excellent Harbours, and the latter with a good Fortrefs at *Halifax*, where our Men of War may rendezvous, refit, refresh and dispose of their Prizes, in the Neighbourhood of flourishing Colonies, where they can be plentifully furnished with Provisions and naval Stores, and in such a Latitude, that the Worm cannot do the Ships in or out of Harbour any Damage. And by that Means, while our Nation remains Master at Sea, we can pretty well prevent any numerous Supplies coming that Way to *America*. Three capital Nations, consisting each of many Tribes, have been hitherto the only Impediment to the *French's* making the Gulf of *Mexico* the sole Passage to *Ohio*. The *Welinis*, as already mentioned, have before now their Destiny determined. The *Cherokees* are fluctuating; but how the *Chicalaws* stand, I have not heard lately; if they waver, they are gone for ever. Unpolished as our *Indians* are, they must know their Interest lies in siding with the Strongest, and that it is best coming about while it is yet fair Weather. If they see we have no Forces to the Southward to support them in our Friendship, that will not be long first; for they have neither Arms, Cloathing, or Ammunition, but from the *Europeans*, and cannot do without them; and if we cannot supply them, they must have recourse to the *French*, even supposing no Violence were used. If these are lost, there will be so easy, though long a Passage to *Ohio*, without one Land-Carriage by the Way, and at all Seasons of the Year, that that by *St. Laurence* will be for ever abandoned. It cannot be above two Years before that is brought about, if the Southern Colonies are abandoned.

It may perhaps be represented, that the Militia there may go against the Enemy, as they do in the Northern Colonies. The Thing is impossible; they have for the far greater Part scarce Whites enough to prevent the Defection of their Slaves; and if any considerable Party should happen to be defeated when abroad, it would be scarce possible to prevent their total Revolt. The dangerous Consequences of the *French's* being suffered to remain on *Ohio* to the *British* Interest; the Necessity of securing the Country back of *Carolina* in Time, and some of our Mistakes in *Indian* Affairs, have been pointed out in the Analysis, † to which I beg leave to refer the Reader.

Some

Some may perhaps imagine, that let the inland Parts of *Florida* be ever so free to the *French*, we have it still in our Power, with our superior Fleets, to prevent theirs coming to *Mobile* or *New Orleans* from *France* with Supplies of Men, Arms or Provisions. As for Provisions, they stand in need of none; the Settlements on *Ohio* and its Branches, *Junundat* and *Detroit*, are now so many Plantations, and not Garrisons of Soldiers, and capable with Ease of supplying them. As we put them to no Use of Arms, or Destruction of Ammunition, what they have already will last them a long while. But this signifies little. It is impossible for our Fleet, were we to fit out the utmost our Nation is capable of, to secure the Gulph of *Mexico* at all. There is no Road, Harbour or Town, that can give us any Relief of Provisions or naval Stores, or in the least shelter us in a Storm, or furnish a healthy Landing to refresh the Men and clean the Ships. Our being destitute of these, no Ships after a Voyage from *England* can remain on an unhealthy Coast, a hot Climate, or in a Latitude the most variable for Calms, Gusts and Storms, without destroying near all the Seamen by the Hospital or Jail Fever; and if in their Distresses they retire to *Jamaica*, they cannot be benefited in the least, as we have learnt from fatal Experience: If they retire to *Virginia*, the nearest Place where there is sufficient Depth of Water for large Ships, or any other of the Colonies thence Northward, they may indeed relieve themselves, but at a more fatal Expence to the Nation, of spreading malignant Fevers to compleat our Misfortunes. Some may suppose that the Fleets may first refresh in *Virginia*, and then go and cruize in the Gulf of *Mexico*. The Passage from *Virginia* thither, though the Distance is not very great, will take more Time than from the *Canaries*, the stated Winds and the Currents making the Difference. Thus I have represented a few of the many fatal Consequences that have already followed the drawing away the *British* Forces from *Virginia*; and pointed out the few, though fatal ones, that still impend and must follow, if not timely prevented. And if these follow, what will prevent their making Use of the River *Potomack*, now abandoned by the *British* Forces, and secured only by one inconsiderable Sconce. And in that Case, let me ask this Letter-Writer, what Occasion will the *French* have for *St. Laurence* River or *Mississippi*, when furnished with so much better and shorter Passage than either?

Supplies to
Mississippi and
Mobile not to
be prevented
by our Fleets.
Provisions
they have e-
nough: Arms
and Ammu-
nition they use
little.
The Reason
why the *Brit-
ish* Fleets can-
not cruize in
the Gulf of
Mexico.

Bad Climate
and no Har-
bours.
Jamaica unfit.
Virginia tho'
nearest is too
far.
Vessels may
go in less
Time from
the *Canaries*
to *Mississippi*
than from
Virginia.
The Conclu-
sion of this
Article.

SECT. II.

The Difficulties formerly met on the Frontiers of Virginia now mostly removed.

IN Consequence of his former Proposition, the Author takes the Liberty to condemn the Measures proposed by his Majesty, of carrying the Expedition, by the Way of *Virginia*, directly to *Ohio*, by saying that "Had *Lraddeck's* Army succeeded in that Enterprize, it would have been

The Lib-
erty taken by
the Letter-
Writer with
his Majesty's
Proposal an-
swered.

The Absurdity of sending BRITISH FORCES to VIRGINIA, answered.

"a useless and untenable Acquisition." The Nearness of the Country on *Ohio* to the Sea, that Way, has been already mentioned. And since so many Representations have been made of the unfurmountable Difficulties that the Army met there, and the same insinuated in this Letter to prevent a fresh Attempt by *Virginia*, the Reader will not be displeased to have that Affair cleared up, and the Rout compared with that to *Ojsego* from *Albany* and *Skenectady*.

Navigation of Potomack, with Ships to Alexandria. Portage 6 M. Flats to South Mountain and Battoes to South Branch. Dimensions of Albany Battoes.

Potomack River is capable of bearing the largest Ships to *Alexandria*. Goods may be sent thence in Shallops to *Rock-Creek* on the *Maryland* Side. Then a Portage of 22 Miles by a sound Road, fit for Winter Carriage, may be made to the *Senegar Mills*, which are above all the lower Falls. The Portage on the *Virginia* Side is fit only in dry Weather. The Water thence to the *South* Mountain, is capable of inland flat-bottomed Boats that will carry 8 or 10 Ton. There a Rift a Mile and three Quarters long, though passable for smaller Craft, obstructs the Passage for these greater ones. If we are obliged here to make a Portage, it must be on the *Virginia* Side, near 8 Miles in Length, and must ferry *Sbanedore* in the Way. But experienced Battoe-Men, with proper Battoes, would find but little Difficulty in going up or down, though the Water is very rapid, and the Channel winding. Battoes, like those of the *Mobocks* River, 25 Feet long, 3 Feet 3 Inches broad, and 2 Feet deep, capable of carrying 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ C. will go from this Place in any Season, and with scarce any Obstruction, to the Mouth of the *South* Branch; and in the Spring over three or four considerable Rifts to *Will's Creek*, and carry Provisions for 100 Men a Week*, and in that Season with much larger Battoes to the *South* Branch.

A Magazine should be erected near the *South* Branch, or *Will's Creek*.

If our Magazine were established near the Mouth of the *South* Branch, and furnished early in the Spring, when the Water is high, Battoes of 2 Ton Burthen might be used. Oats, the Artillery and *European* Stores, must be brought from *Alexandria*. Bread, Flour, *Indian* Corn, live Cattle and Pork, are as cheap and in as great Plenty at *William's-Ferry*, furnished in the adjacent plentiful Country, as any where in *America*. Though General *Braddock* came over when no Contracts for Provisions had ever been made there, it is well known that no Army in the World could be furnished with better Provisions, or on more reasonable Terms.

Worse Water in the Way to *Ojsego*.

In the Way from *Skenectady* to *Ojsego*, besides the Difficulties of three Carrying-Places, there are ten times more bad Rifts than from the Falls of *Potomack* to the *South* Branch. But then, before and since General *Braddock's* Arrival, the inland Navigation of *Potomack* had never been made use of; for that Reason the People of *Maryland* and *Virginia*, had the

* That is usually allowed to be 2 Barrels of Beef or Pork, 4 Barrels of Flour, a Bag or 3 Bushels and a Half of Pease or *Indian* Meal, a Firkin of Butter, and 24 Gallons of Rum, if required on hard Services.

European Officers thought it practicable, knew nothing of the Construction of Battoes or their Management. Between *Skenesbady* and *Oswego*, where the inland Navigation had been established and perfected thirty Years ago, and daily practised, General *Shirley* this Summer was so sensible of the Want of experienced Battoe-Men when he had discharged some, and employed others as Rangers; and thinking to employ some of the Troops in the Battoes, he found himself extremely disappointed. In the *Mohocks* and *Seneca* Rivers these unexperienced Persons were terrified at Places easy to those accustomed to Battoes, and thought it less Risk of hanging for Desertion, and leaving the Battoes and Ladings, than of drowning by running down the several Rifts and Falls.

G. Shirley's Experience.

Were Stores and a Train brought again to *Alexandria*, it would be advisable to get the Flat-Men from *Delaware* River, and the Battoe-Men from *Skenesbady*, and the Flats and Battoes provided by the End of *March*, or the Middle of *April* at farthest, and then there would be no Danger of Want of Water. By Means of Water-Carriage our Magazines might be furnished early, which could not be so well done by Land, because of the extreme Badness of our Roads at the breaking up of Winter, and the Weakness of our Draught-Horses at that Season. We might thus gain a Month or two in Time, and preserve our Horses unfatigued, till there would be Occasion to draw over Land to the Waters of *Ohio*. And this may be begun some Time in *June*, when the Grass is up, and the Ground usually got pretty dry.

How the Navigation up Potomack is to be improved. Advantages thereof.

The extreme Fatigue that General *Braddock* met with in this Passage, was owing to several Causes. The Ground was a great Part uneven, stony and hilly, and no Road had ever been made for Carriages over it. To make this as they marched, where all the Country is yet covered with Woods, and in Danger of *Indian* Enemies, was a laborious Undertaking. But this is now effected, and will require but little Trouble to put in Repair where damaged. After *Braddock's* unhappy Defeat, and the Destruction of the Train, Ammunition, Stores and Provisions, the Waggon furnished only with proper Loadings, Colonel *Dunbar*, in his Retreat, was able to travel good Journeys 12 or 15 Miles a Day; and in the March out the Train met no Difficulty; which sufficiently prove the Delays were not owing to the Badness of the Way, but over-loading the Carriages in going out.

Gen. Braddock's Difficulties, whence they proceeded. Roads to be cut. Now effected. The Carriages over-loaden.

It could not be expected the Officers would have foreseen these Difficulties, as they were Strangers from *Europe*, unused to Woods and the Fatigues of the *American* Campaigns, and unacquainted with the Geography of the surrounding Country. I have Reason to know, that they used all the Industry and Care they could in procuring Guides, Intelligence and Advice. They little imagined the Dangers and Difficulties so great as they found them, and were at first too apt to suspect some prudent Precautions they received, to arise from Timidity and Cowardice. This is now no longer a Difficulty; we have a great many able and experienced Officers,

The Officers unexperienced in American Marches.

It is now otherwise, who.

who are perfectly well acquainted with the Country, and whatever is necessary to encounter in a Wood-land March.

Difficulties in getting Carriages no longer to.

An unexperienced Waggon Master was the Cause of supposing the Pass difficult.

An Error we need not fall into again.

The Difficulties met in getting Waggon and providing Forage we know how to avoid. The Difficulties that arose from employing an unexperienced Waggon Master are innumerable; as time spent in overloading, drawing forward, carrying back, and unloading the Waggon, so as to have consumed all the Forage by the time they had well occasion for it; their tying up the Horses afterwards all Night without Provender, which reduced the Creatures so as to be scarce able to walk with their own Skeletons; his ordering Carriage Horses to be mixed with those used to the Draught, which made even common Ground difficult. This has been so dear a bought Experience, that there is no danger of speedily forgetting it. The Difficulties that arose from this Cause, which were indeed what gave an Opinion of the great Trouble of drawing Carriages over this Ground, will on another Attempt be avoided.

The Passages from Laurel Hill to Fort Du Quesne, by Water.

If we shall ever again be Masters of *Laurel Hill*, and the Passage of the few Miles thence to *Youghio-Gani* and *Monaungabela*, we shall be but an easy Day or two's Voyage down either Stream to *Fort Du Quesne*; in the first, by a rapid Stream without Falls; and by the latter, in a fine gentle Current, capable in dry Weather of Flats of five or six Ton Burthen; and in Freshes even without floating Batteries; for it then rises 6 or 8 Feet.

Several Ways from Laurel Hill to Ohio.

To conduct an Enterprize from *Laurel Hill* towards *Fort Du Quesne*, an Officer would have his Choice of many Ways by Land or Water. The Neck between the two Rivers is pretty even sound Ground, but not so wide as laid down in my Map, and therefore more easily defended.

There is but one Pass Westward, and that is abandoned.

But from *Virginia*, *Maryland* and *Pensylvania* Westward, there is no Part that Waggon can cross the long Chain of Mountains called the *Laurel Hill*, that we know of, for some Scores of Miles, but at the Place where the *Union Camp* was, and *Braddock's* routed Party joined the Reserve under *Col. Dunbar*. The Consideration of this will explain the fatal Consequence of *Gen. Shirley's* ordering away the Troops, in high Summer, to *Albany*; when they had three or four Months, and above a thousand effective Men, to have put that Place in a Posture of Defence, exclusive of the Loss of the *Indians* already mentioned. The Enemy have not yet secured it; and we may, if we attempt it this Spring. If we have it, we have the Gate of *Ohio*; if the *French*, they have the Gate to the Sea. In Allusion to the vast Importance of this Pass, I called in my Map the *Falls of Youghio-Gani*, a few Miles to the Northward of it, by the Name of *Obiopyle Falls*. The Pass itself is mentioned in the Analysis, p. 23, and 24. If we secure this Pass, we may yet attempt *Ohio* at our Leisure; but never to Effect without it.

The Importance of securing it.

Supposing

Supposing the Time and Expence of Carriage from *Conegoe* Mouth at *Williams's* Ferry, which is the Center of a fine fertile well cultivated Country, to *Fort Du Quesne*, were compared, with that from *Skene's* *Lady* to *Oswego*, we should find the former would be done in as little Time, and with far less Expence; besides, that if the Quantity of Provision were considerable, it could be had with greater Certainty, and brought cheaper to *Conegoe* than to *Skene's* *Lady* †.

The Carriages from Pennsylvania and Virginia to Ohio, cheaper than from *Skene's* *Lady* to *Oswego*.

Until *Braddock's* unhappy Defeat, and still more unhappy Order of his Majesty's Forces from those Parts, the Dangers of travelling were but inconsiderable. The Assembly of *Pennsylvania* had about 70 Labourers, unarmed, and without a Guard for the greater Part of the Way, who cut a Road from *Parnels Knob* † to the *Allegheni* Mountain ‖, about 90 Miles in Length, mostly through uninhabited Mountains without Obstruction, and did not leave off till they had Advice of that fatal Defeat. All the *Indians* in the Country, except those whom the *French* had brought with them to *Du Quesne*, were in Friendship with us. For tho' they have since enumerated several Causes of Complaint against us, and some not unjust ones, they were such as a little Care in skilful Persons might have rectified, and would never have caused a Breach with us, had not the Necessity they were thrown under by our deserting them, while in the Power of the *French* and their *Indians*, compelled them to follow the Fortune of the Conquerors. If *Fort Du Quesne* were taken, the same Cause would bring them

Little Danger from the *Indians* till the Abolition of *Laurel Hill* † Gg. † Gg. The *Indians* are gone to the *French* out of Necessity.

Were we victorious they would return to our Friendship.

† A Battoe Load is 14 Hund. 2^d Qurs. besides the two Men and their Provisions.

	To <i>Oswego</i> .	£.	s.	d.
Two Men's Hire, who are 18 or 20 Days going and returning at 5 l. each		10	00	00
Their Allowance of Provisions and Rum		02	00	00
Hawling at the Long Fall on the <i>Mohock's</i> River,		00	09	00
at the great Carrying-Place to <i>Wood Creek</i>		01	07	00
Wear of the Battoe, which costs 5 l. 15 s. and will last about 10 Trips		00	10	00
		14	06	00

To *Du Quesne*.

Two Men's Hire, their Provision, Wear of the Battoe, 3 Days from <i>Conegoe</i> to the South Branch		02	02	00
Ninety or one hundred Miles Portage in a Waggon to the Mouth of <i>Red-</i>		03	10	00
<i>Stone Creek</i> , 7 Days, at 10 s.		03	00	00
Returning 6 Days, at 10 s.		02	02	00
Two Boatmen, &c. 3 Days, going to, and returning from <i>Fort Du Quesne</i>		02	02	00
In all 19 Days		10	14	00

As the Battoes used here in both Rivers, especially the latter, might be made much larger than those to *Oswego*, that Part of the Expence may be much abridg'd. Without that, the Difference in Favour of this Way is 25 per Cent. As the Waggon is supposed here to be laden with only 14 or 15 Hund. like a Battoe, there would be but little Difficulty in the Road, or in performing it in the time propos'd. And if we should be obliged to make the Waggon Loads 2 or 3 Hund. lighter at first, we shall then be on a Par with the Carriage to *Oswego*.

them to our Side again, then the Road to *Du Quesne* would have far the Advantage of that to *Oswego*. The Carriage to *Oswego* is improved to the utmost: The Roads to *Du Quesne* new cut and difficult, but with a few Years Use will be so much improved as that the Expence of Carriage thither will be less by one Quarter.

The Nearness of *Du Quesne* to three numerous Colonies. Many ready to settle at *Ohio*.

The Nearness of *Du Quesne* to three numerous Colonies abounding in all the Necessaries and Elegancies of Life, must be no small Advantage in an Attempt that Way. Add to this, the great Number of Planters, which the most moderate computed at 5000 Families, who were ready to leave *Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pensilvania, New Jersey* and *Connecticut*, and settle a Colony on *Ohio*, had General *Braddock* succeeded and the Land been granted. Above half the People in lower Circumstances in these several Colonies, would in two or three Years have flocked thither. It would then have been a Wonder that the *French* had Power enough in *America*, or could have sent a Sufficiency from *Europe* to annoy them.

None to the Northward.

But to turn our Eye on the other Side.—Are there any that expect to settle where this Author points out that an Attempt is to be made? No, no; Land there is not for Settlers. And without Settlers our Nation is not capable of defending large extended Frontiers.

Difficulties to be removed by his Majesty:

A Claim of Difficulties might be enumerated, the first of which General *Braddock* experienced in near three Weeks waiting for Mr. *Shirley* at *Annapolis*; by which the Expedition was so much retarded, that the Enemy had Time to send Reinforcements of *French* and *Indians*, and to improve their Works at Fort *Du Quesne*; to which, in all human Probability, that Gentleman's unhappy Fate was owing. The others were exactly of the same Number as the Appointments made this Summer. If any future Congresses are to be held, or Appointments made, Difficulties arising from such *Delays* can only be removed by his Majesty's removing the Cause of them.

C H A P. II.

How far General Shirley's Conduct was conducive to the Preservation of Oswego.

The Letter-Writer's Opinion of the Preservation of *Oswego*, to be examined into.

THE Letter-Writer infers, that “ Nothing could be more fortunate “ than that Part of the Scheme for dividing the Troops, and General *Shirley's* proceeding to *Oswego*, by which Means that Garrison has “ been preserved from falling into the Hands of the Enemies; which, but “ for

"for this singular Precaution, would have been its inevitable Fate." When the Affair of the Preservation of *Oswego* is stated, the Reader will be enabled to judge how far General *Shirley*, whose distinguished Character and Reputation stand in no need of false Varnishes, was conducing to it.

The Scheme for a naval Armament at *Oswego*, was first proposed by the Honourable *Thomas Pownall*, to the Congress of Commissioners of the several Colonies met at *Albany* in June 1754; Copies were sent to *England*, and taken by the Commissioners for the Perusal of their respective Governments; one of which I had a very early Opportunity of seeing. This Scheme, by Order from the Ministry, was to be put in Execution, and by the Result of the Congress at *Alexandria*, was committed to the Direction of his Excellency General *Shirley*.

The naval Armament on Lake Ontario first proposed by Mr. T. Pownall.

His Excellency's Delay to meet at the Congress till near three Weeks later than Appointment, was but the first. The Congress was held at *Alexandria* April 16, 1755; the first Parcel of Workmen did not reach *Oswego* till the 27th of May, and those from *Boston* not till ten Days later, who were to build the bigger Vessels; whereas, had the Meeting been at *Annapolis* at the Time appointed, and tolerable Care used, all the Workmen might have been at *Oswego* before the Beginning of May, and the Vessels fit for sailing by the beginning of July at farthest. Though this Year the tempestuous Weather did not begin till October, it commonly does in August. And our Traders at *Oswego* know that the Indians who come from the adjacent Parts and upper Lakes, embrace the Advantage of the calm State of the Lakes in April, May, June and July. Inasmuch, that by the End of July the Trade is near all over at *Oswego*, and the far greater Part of the Traders returned, or on their Way to the Settlements. But by Delays upon Delays, the Vessels were not ready till near the End of September, though about 22000 l. Sterling was paid in the Spring for carrying on the Enterprize on this Side. Their Decks are made of Hemlock Wood (called Spruce in *Pensilvania*) which is not in the least fit for such Use; for by the General's Delay to come to *Oswego* with the Forces, it was not thought safe to send 12 Miles to the Falls to get white Pine, as they had not Soldiers enough to guard the Workmen so far off.

General Shirley's Delays to meet General Brad-dock, and in other Things; their Consequence.

The Vessels instead of being ready by the End of June,

were not fit till near the End of September.

The Vessels Decks defective; and why.

That the Public may understand how far the General was concerned in the Preservation of *Oswego*, a short Journal of the Affairs there will be of Service.

In the Beginning of Summer Captain King commanded 100 Men at *Oswego*, when the Place was devoid of its fenceless.

Captain *King*, now amongst the happy, who to a perfect Humanity and Honesty, which were natural to him, had added the Accomplishments of a good Officer, commanded a Garrison of a hundred Men at *Oswego* in the Beginning of the Summer. There were no Works then but the old Fort, which mounted 8 four Pounders, and is incapable of Defence by reason of

The Absurdity of sending BRITISH FORCES to VIRGINIA, answered.

its being commanded by high Ground right across a narrow River which had all the Wood standing upon it, and not one of our Forces. In this State was the Garrison when

The Danger
of Oswego
then.

May 24, Thirty *French* Battoes past by in Sight,
— 26, Eleven more.

Its Safety not
owing to Ge-
neral Shirley.

As these Battoes commonly contain each 15 or 16 Men, we may reasonably suppose the Forces exceeded six hundred. But what might have past by in the Night could not be known. This Force, with a single Mortar, would have easily taken *Oswego* had they made the Attempt; but a more interesting Object, OHIO, was their Pursuit. Let me ask this Letter-Writer,—What Hand had his Excellency General *Shirley* in the Preservation of *Oswego* at this Time? That it was now in Danger is past a Doubt.

Capt. Broad-
street com-
mands 300
Men at Os-
wego.

The French
pass by and
could not be
prevented;
and why.

The Defects
of our Battoes
tho' discover-
ed in May,
yet no Reme-
dy was pro-
vided.

May 27, Capt. *Broadstreet*, to whose Conduct the Public is much indebted, arrived with a Command of two Companies, some Swivel-Guns, and the first Parcel of Workmen.

May 29, Eleven more *French* Battoes past by in Sight: But though our Forces and Workmen exceeded three hundred, we could not venture to attack them, as they were near 4 Miles in the Offing, had large *Batteaux* wherein the Soldiers could stand to fire without Danger of over-setting, whereas ours, intended for smaller Streams, will not hold above 6 or 7 Men, and are so ticklish, that an inadvertent Motion of one Man will upset them. Though we were sensible thus early of the *Unfitness of our Batteaux for the Lake*, and that it was impossible for them to bear the Weather that would suit the bigger Vessels to sail with, no Care was taken to provide larger. Nor would it indeed have been practicable at *Oswego* for Want of Iron-Work, which could not be provided there, because the whole Expedition rested on one Pair of Bellows. If any Accident had befallen that, all must have dropt. Smiths they had enough.

June 7, the
last Ship-Car-
penters arrive.

June 7, The *Boston* Ship-Carpenters arrived; and now, Workmen and all included, they amount to 320.

The first En-
glish Vessel
on Lake On-
tario.

June 28, 1755, The first little Schooner was launched and fitted out. She was of 40 Feet Keel and 14 Oars, and mounted 12 Swivels. This is the first Vessel the *English* had on Lake *Ontario*.

An Alarm of a
great Prepa-
ration at Fron-
tenac.

This was the Force at *Oswego*. The Forces then present were by Order of General *Braddock*, and sent up by Governor *Delancy*, and victualled at the Expence of the Province of *New-York*. And fortunate it was the Colony Provision was there; for so little Precaution was taken in getting the King's Provisions up, that the Forces under General *Shirley*, when they arrived there, must have perished, had they not subsisted upon that laid in for the Commands under *Broadstreet* and *King*.

In the Beginning of *July*, when General *Shirley* and his Forces had not reached *New-York* in the Way to *Oswego*, Advice came by the *Indians*, that near 5000 Men were gathered at Fort *Frontenac* under the Command of a Gentleman of great Distinction, with a View to attack *Oswego*. Some Forces being afterwards discovered behind a Point four Miles to the Eastward of *Oswego*, the Schooner was sent out to reconnoitre them. They were unable to determine their Number; for though they discovered but a few Tents near the Shore, they suspected many more might be in the Woods out of Sight, as the *Indians* assured the *English* that they amounted to seven hundred Men. Though nothing could exceed the Spirit of Capt. *Broadstreet*, the commanding Officer, on this Occasion, or the Alacrity of the Soldiers and Workmen, which alone saved the Place, if we were truly in Danger, when the *Indian* Spies came to view our State, yet that Gentleman's Good Sense must be convinced, that had the Number of the Enemy amounted to seven hundred, and had fixed themselves on the opposite Hill across the River, where there was nothing to obstruct them, with only a Mortar or two, it would have been impossible to defend the old Fort had a Shell or two been thrown into it; or for a Man to shew his Head in the Ship-yard without being shot from behind a Sand-Bank on the further Shore, which the Cannon of the Fort could not command.

The Danger of *Oswego* had it been true.

The Attack was expected about the 13th of *July*. That it was not attacked we all know. Let me again ask this Letter-Writer; What Hand had his Excellency General *Shirley* in the Preservation of *Oswego* at this Time, who was, with all his Forces, two or three hundred Miles off? We have since learnt that this was only a Feint of the Enemy.

Its Safety was not owing to General *Shirley*. It was a Feint only.

By the fatal 9th of *July*, General *Braddock*, after surmounting a thousand Difficulties, met his unhappy Fate almost under the Walls of Fort *Duquesne*, when General *Shirley* had scarce reached *Albany*. Were I to use Arguments with the Letter-Writer as he is disposed to do with the Public, I might represent the Passage to *Albany* more difficult than to Fort *Duquesne*, because his Excellency General *Shirley* was able to go but so little a Way amongst Friends, when General *Braddock* had gone so far amongst Enemies.. The Difference was in the Men, the Argument will not hold.

Braddock's and *Shirley's* Motions compared.

The first Part of the worthy Colonel *Schuyler's* Regiment of *New Jersey* Provincials, arrived at *Oswego* the 20th of *July*, and himself with the Remainder and the Artillery some few Days after. The Waters began to be so low in the *Mohocks* River and *Wood-Creek*, by the Delays in getting the Artillery to *Skeneclady* in Time, and the Difficulties in getting them to *Oswego*, grew daily greater and greater.

New Jersey Force arrived at *Oswego*.

The General's Arrival at *Oswego*, was the 17th or 18th of *August*; and the last of the Troops and Artillery under Colonel *Mercer*, the 31st of the same Month.

The Absurdity of sending BRITISH FORCES to VIRGINIA, answered.

September 18, A Council of War was called, where it was agreed to go to *Niagra*. And in Consequence of that Resolution, the Ammunition and the little Provision, &c. were put on board.

26th, The Troops ordered to embark, but countermanded upon account of bad Weather.

27th, At another Council it was resolved not to go to *Niagra*, it being too late in the Season. And it was agreed that it was necessary to employ as many Men as could be spared from Duty, to work at building a Fort on the Hill on the opposite Side of the River, Barracks, &c. for Winter Quarters.

Here let me ask this Letter-Writer—

1. What was the Reason that General *Shirley* was not at *Ofwego* six Weeks sooner, according to the Time appointed ?

2. As he was delayed so long before he came to *Ofwego*, why did he delay a full Month longer before it was determined to go on the Expedition ?

3. When that Resolution was taken, and the Vessels ready, why was there a still further Delay of eight Days before the Troops were ordered to imbark ? The very Day before that on which they found out that it was too late in the Season for an Expedition.

The Command under *Broadstreet* well provided, those under *Shirley* in Want.

The Command under Captain *Broadstreet* was well supplied with Provisions, and they had some Months Stock in reserve when joined by the other Forces. Their Store was too inconsiderable to serve so many without fresh Supplies, which reduced the Forces afterwards to great Streights. It could not be expected that the Supplies could be very regular here, when the Soldiers left to secure the Carrying-Place at *Wood-Creek*, were obliged to desert it, many of them for want of Food.

The English naval Armament at *Ofwego* 1755.

About the Middle of *September* all the four Vessels were ready, viz.

A deck'd Sloop,	8 Guns 4 lbs.	30 Swivels.
A deck'd Schooner,	8 Guns 4 lbs.	28 Swivels.
An undeck'd Schooner,	—	14 Swivels, 14 Oars.
An undeck'd Schooner,	—	12 Swivels, 14 Oars:

A Feint made of moving, which was impossible; and why.

With this Armament, and a sufficient Number of small Battoes, far too little for the Lake in calm Weather, his Excellency prepared as above-mentioned, as it were in earnest, to attack the Enemy. But alas, the Fleet had not twelve Days Provision on board, and none to be had within 2 or 300 Miles of the Place he intended to attack; and what they had was not

The Absurdity of sending BRITISH FORCES to VIRGINIA, answered.

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not sufficient to carry them to the Sight of the Enemy. Besides, they had not left above three Days Provisions with the remaining Garrison at *Oswego*. Were the Public to ask, Was this Feint intended to cause a Diversion to Friends or Enemies? No doubt the Letter-Writer could let us into this Secret.

After this, when they had got some little Provisions, tho' no way sufficient for a Siege in distant Parts, where there could come no Supplies; and the General made the People believe, that they were to let out the 26th of *September*, through Mercy, a Storm arose, which determined him to unrig, and lay by all Thoughts of attacking the Enemy. Mercy I seriously esteem it, if the General was in earnest. Had it arose while they were on the Lake, or at a Distance from *Oswego*, great part of the Soldiers had been inevitably drowned, or have perished with Hunger: And a Favour it was to the General, to have so honourable a Reason for closing the Campaign, and returning to the Settlements.

A new Feint, excused by a Storm.

In Consequence of this Campaign of the General, the Author exults in our Happiness. "If, says he, one may argue from the *Vessels*, which General *Shirley* built last Summer upon the Lake, the Works erected at *Oswego*, and the strong Garrison left there this Winter, &c." I have already mentioned to whom we are obliged for the Proposal of a naval Armament at *Oswego*: and this Hint will explain the Service it was of.

The Letter-Writer's Opinion of the State of *Oswego*.

The *Vessels* built here, were unrigged and laid up soon after they were compleated; while a Vessel of the *French* was cruising the Lake, and carrying Supplies to *Niagra*; and five others, as the *Indians* said, as large as ours, were ready to launch at *Frontenac*. And moreover, the greater Part of the Time they were fit for Service, they were waiting on the Imbarkation.

The same better explained. The *Vessels*.

The *Works* on the Hill, opposite the old Fort at *Oswego*, were not compleated when General *Shirley* came away; nor were they begun but a little Time before: Whereas had his Excellency's Forces, detained in the *Mohocks* Country, dissipating as fast almost as they were recruited, been there all the Summer, *Oswego* might indeed have been well fortified, and proper Accommodations for the Soldiers provided in Time.

The Fortifications.

The *Garrison* at *Oswego*, I am not able to learn its Number. 600 Men, or thereabouts, was the first Return: I hear they are since multiplied to 1100 without any visible Means. How the Garrison is for Provisions, the Public may be anxious: They are already clamorous for their Pay, which was forgotten. We all wish for its Safety.

The Garrison.

Pay forgotten.

The Reader may observe, that though the Letter-Writer was very compendious in pointing out, what the Safety of *Oswego* was owing to;

The Preservation of *Oswego* was truly owing to the De-

yet

feat given the French, Sep. 8. by Gen. Johnson, at Lake George.

The Absurdity of sending BRITISH FORCES to VIRGINIA, answered.

yet it may not be amiss as I have shewn negatively what it was not owing to, just to point out what it was owing to.

The *Weight of the Confederates* is so considerable in the Safety of *Oswego*, that their Neighbourhood preserved it all the last War, when 50 Men and one Mortar might have taken it, had they not been on our Side: And to tell the Reader a Matter that ought to be no Secret to the Letter-Writer, the latter preserved it the former Part of this Summer, not the *Precaution of General Shirley's proceeding thither*, but the Caution of the *French*, in not violating the Peace with the Confederates, which an Attack upon *Oswego* would inevitably have done.

But when he comes to consider, the Stroke levelled at Major General *Johnson*, who commanded in Chief over the *American Forces* near *Lake Sacrament*; when General *Shirley* had not 6 Days Provisions at *Oswego*; † he will perceive it was owing to the happy Defeat, given by our brave *New-England-Men*, under that worthy Gentleman, to the *French Forces*, consisting of *Regulars, Canadians and Indians*, under the experienced Baron *Diekau*. Had the Issue of that Battle been otherwise, the Communication with *Oswego* had been inevitably cut off: And therefore, considering how short the Provisions were there at that Time, the Garrison, without any Attack, must immediately have shifted for themselves, or have staid there to eat one another. This was truly saving *Oswego*.

C H A P. III.

An Enquiry into the Advantages and Disadvantages that would arise from the taking of Fort Frontenac.

The Letter-Writer's Opinion of the Consequence of Frontenac.

His Mistake proved from Charlevoix.

THE Honours reaped by his Excellency this Campaign, are introduced by the Letter-Writer, as a Prelude only of what we may expect in the next. *Frontenac* is the intended Scene; for, says he, "Nothing to Purpose can be done without the Reduction of Fort *Frontenac*, which commands the Entrance from *Canada*." This may pass excellently with some: 'Tis pity but it were true. Father *Charlevoix*, who had been on the Spot, says expressly, that it does not command the Entrance of the River, because Islands lie against it, and

† N. B. When Advice reached *Oswego*, of this Action, the Army was eating the last Day's short Allowance of 4 Oz. of Flour, and 2 Oz. of Pork a Man.

any thing may pass by on the further side without its Command. The *Galette*, he says, entirely covers *Canada* on that side. He commends this as a proper Situation; and rejects the Post of *Frontenac*, as of no value to the Security of *Canada*. *Frontenac*, he says, is a small League from the Entrance of the River; its Situation, by reason of surrounding Marshes, unhealthy: Even some of our People, last Summer, have gone into the Entrance of the River in Whale-Boats, without seeing Fort *Frontenac*; so little has it the Command of the River. Barks fit for the Navigation of Lake *Ontario*, can go to the *Galette*: And Father *Charlevoix* says, that a Vessel, with a good Wind, may go in two Days from the *Galette* to *Niagra*. With *Frontenac*, we would be as much at a Loss to secure the Entrance of Lake *Ontario*, on that side, as if we had not it; unless we had, at the same Time, a superior Fleet. If we have a superior Fleet, we need not be at the Expence of taking or keeping it; or of going still lower down to the *Galette*.

I have just now heard in Conversation, that Fort *Frontenac* is wanted for a Harbour for our Shipping; because *Oswego* has not Depth enough for large Vessels. I have never learnt what Depth there is at *Frontenac*. Nothing more needs be said against its Fitness for that Purpose, than that it is froze up at least four Months in the Year; is sometimes extremely endangered by Ice in the Spring; and lies on the Enemy's Shore, without any extraordinary natural Situation, where for five or six Months in the Year, there would not be a Possibility for us to relieve it, if besieged.

Its unsuitness for an English Harbour; and why.

The Straits of *Niagra*, below the Falls, is quite placid for several Miles up from the Lake, and very deep; it is sheltered with high Banks, and scarce ever covered with Ice; being the most open Place in Winter, of any in these Latitudes in *America*. The Spring Ice is broke to Atoms and thaw'd by the Falls, as it comes from Lake *Erie*: And no thick Ice is scarce ever formed below the Falls. If a Harbour is wanted, there is the best here of any in *America*. If our Shipping lay there, we could not indeed relieve the Place for four or five Months in the Year; but then, the Enemy has the same Obstruction against coming to besiege it. At *Niagra*, the Shipping can be kept afloat all Winter, which can be done no where else in these Parts of *America*; which is a great Security against any bold Attempt to burn them in Harbour. From hence it is obvious, how much more it is our Duty to turn our Arms against *Niagra*, if we had Regard to nothing but the Expediency of Things, exclusive of what is his Majesty's Command, than to *Frontenac*.

Niagra the best Harbour in North America.

Its other Advantages over Frontenac.

That the Attack, by the Way of *Oswego*, was intended last Summer against *Niagra*, is known to all the World; and that it had been resolved at the Congress at *Alexandria*, that General *Shirley* should carry it into Execution. If we allow this Letter-Writer to know Mr. *Shirley's* Sentiments, and to tell the Truth, he has let the World into a strange Secret.

The L. Writer lets us into an interesting Secret, that Mr. Shirley's should be further inquired into.

Secret. He says, "I am extremely surprized to find the Author of "the Map you sent me, endeavouring to obstruct the Attempt upon "Frontenac, by putting a Claim to it, on behalf of his most Christian Majesty." My Map was begun Engraving in November 1754, and finished towards the End of June 1755; the Pamphlet published August 9th next following. That General Shirley's Duty to his Majesty, was to attack *Niagra*, and not *Frontenac*, at that Time, is past a Doubt. How he could be warranted to depart so far from his Destination and the Public Service, as then to have formed a Design on *Frontenac*, I shall leave to be enquired into by those whose Duty it is. If he had not formed a Design on *Frontenac*, prior to the Publication of my Map and Pamphlet, all the Letter-Writer says, of my endeavouring to obstruct that General's Attempt, must fall of itself: For I never could be said to have obstructed a Design before it was designed: Nor could I be justly charged with *Endeavouring to obstruct*, what I had never heard of. The Letter-Writer, to make good the Charge against me, should have informed the Public, that He and I had been let into General *Shirley's* Secret, which he does not say, and I never had.

The L. Writer's Opinion of Frontenac groundless; and why. The French inland Power and Towns. Detroit a Colony.

Supposing *Frontenac* were taken, after spending another Campaign; it is not to be expected, as the Letter-Writer says, "That the Forts "at *Presqu' Isle*, *Riviere-Beuf*, and that at *Du Quesne*, with all the "Encroachments on the *Ohio*, must necessarily fall," for the Reasons already given. And further, the *French* have a fine and numerous Colony at DETROIT, settled above 50 Years, in a Country celebrated for its Fertility, Beauty, and Conveniency, above any Spot in *America*, by those who have seen it; far more capable of supplying the Garrisons on the *Ohio* with Provisions, than the inhospitable Country of *Canada*; where they have never yet been able to raise any Quantity of Winter-Wheat. *Detroit* has not yet indeed furnished any more with Provisions, than the Garrisons and Trading Houses thence to the *Mississippi*, and *Ecorse*; but it is capable of any Quantity, and in as great Perfection as any Place on Earth. The Demand, however, cannot be very great upon it; for the *French* have now learnt, from the fatal Experience of the Settlement attempted under Mr. *Crozat*, to plant Corn where they settle. And for that Purpose, have added Planters to every Garrison, that the Soldiers and they may be a mutual Support to one another. Better Proof need not be given, of the little Want they are in of Provisions on the *Ohio*, than the many Inroads they and their *Indians* have made into our Settlements. They have not carried off either Corn or Cattle, save for present Consumption; though often Riding Horses and Household Goods.

Detroit.

The Capital of *Detroit* contains above 200 Houses, pretty well built; and the Lieutenant Governor is able to support a genteel Equipage. St. Joseph is also a fine Colony, abounding in all the Necessaries of Life; and

St. Joseph.

and will be glad of an Opportunity of a Market for what they can so easily raise as Provisions.

Whatever Reader considers these two Places, and the numerous little Plantations that the *French* have lately spread *Ohio* and its Branches with; and that the common Way, and far the best from *Montreal* to *Detroit*, is by the *Outawas* River, save only in the first and last Month of Winter, and of course the best Way from *Canada* to the Middle of *Ohio*; he will spare me the Trouble of shewing of what little Consequence being content with the Mastery of *Frontenac* will be.

What then would the Consequence of taking *Frontenac* be to the Public? It would give the *French* another Year to secure *Ohio*, and gain over the *Indians* that obstruct their Passage hitherto up *Mississippi*: and take up all the Forces we have in *America* to garrison it. Which indeed are not sufficient, because all the Forces of *Canada* can in two Months be brought against it; and 3000 Men of ours could not be sent in three Months to relieve it in any Season; or a Sufficiency, without a vast standing Army, at any rate.

Advantages given the *French* by taking *Frontenac*. All our Forces are not sufficient to garrison it.

Let me take the Liberty to inform the Public, that if we are by our superior Fleet Masters of Lake *Ontario*, according to Mr. *Pownall's* Proposal, and have *Oswego* and *Niagra*, though the *French* keep *Frontenac*, we are as safe, nay, safer, than if we had it. Having a Place avails us nothing, unless we are able to support it. Six or eight 50 Gun Ships would not cost us more to maintain on Lake *Ontario*, than a suitable Garrison at *Frontenac*. With a suitable naval Armament of much less Value, we can prevent the *French* from *Frontenac's* doing us any Damage.

A superior Fleet on Lake *Ontario* will be better than *Frontenac* to us.

Though we could not raise a Siege of *Frontenac*, we may without much trouble raise that of *Oswego* at any Time that the *French* would be like to invest it, even if our naval Armament was inferior to theirs on the Lake. If our naval Armament was superior to theirs, they could not invest it.

Oswego if besieged may be relieved.

The same would be the Preservation of *Niagra*, were it in our Possession: But they could be of no Service in the Preservation of *Frontenac*, if in our Hands; for they have not Craft to take them by Water, and they cannot march thither by Land.

Some kind Reader may here suggest, that were we Masters of *Frontenac*, we might proceed still further, and drive the *French* quite out of *Canada*. It would be a much better Scheme to drive them all into it. The *French* King is so sensible of the Desire of the *Canadians* to emigrate to the *Ohio*, that there is in *Canada* a very severe Ordinance to forbid the People to leave the Country without Licence. And the People are so earnest to remove, that when new Colonies are to be established there, great Interest is made to get Permission to go. — The Countries of *Ohio*, *Tiughfoghrántie* and

The best Scheme now for America, would be to drive the *French* into, and not out of *Canada*.

Skaniaderâde we want, which are our just Rights, and not the inhospitable *Canada*: Those Countries, the Flower of the whole Globe, I wish to see them drove out of.

C H A P. IV.

An Explanation of the French Title to the Country on the North-west Side of St. Lawrence River, between Fort Frontenac and Montreal.

The Author's
Conduct ex-
amined.

§ p. 11, &c.

An Example
this of my
Care in Ame-
rican Bounda-
ries.

A Reason for
not meddling
with any Place
not clearly
our own.

THE candid Reader who is concerned for the *British* Interest in *America*, must no doubt be anxious to know, whether the vast Extent of the most excellent Land represented in my Analysis § to the Property of the *Confederates*, and of course ours, by the Concession of *France*, in the Treaty of *Utrecht*, is founded on Authority sufficient to excite Public Belief, or that I did only divert myself, as the Letter-writer says, with setting Bounds to Provinces and Empires. To convince the World that I had taken the Degree of Care that an Author, on so serious a Point, owes the Public, I shall here enter into a Detail of the Authorities, whereon that Part is founded, which is now called in question.

I have above explained, how little it is our Interest to meddle with *Frontenac*; let me here add one Argument against meddling with it, if Justice and Public Faith are not clearly in our Favour. Has not the *French* King been representing to all the Courts of *Europe*, that the present Disturbances in *America* have been owing to the ambitious Views and Incroachments of his *Britannick* Majesty? To be sure he has not yet been able to prove the Insinuation; but as sure it is, that it would be rendering him great Service to enable him so to do; and equal Disservice to the King of *Great Britain*, to be thrown under the Odium of acting what we so much detest in the *French*. If we have a just Right to the Land in question, or an exclusive one to the Navigation of *Lake Ontario*, neither will be the less for being candidly examined into. But if we have not, it may save us some Honour, Men and Money, besides Time to attend to our immediate Rights and Interest. What we acquire, that is justly our own during a War, we shall be able to preserve at an ensuing Treaty of Peace: What we get that is not our own, must be restored to the Enemy. To what Purpose then can false Claims tend, but to endless and fruitless Expeditions? And how can such serve the Honour of a Prince, who prides himself in being the honestest Man in *Europe*; and who by a *Reign*, long, happy, and glorious, has convinced all Mankind he is so?

The

The Discovery of *North-River*, at the Entrance of which now stands the City of *New-York*, was by *Henry Hudson*, an *Englishman* in the Service of the *Dutch East-India Company*, in 1609. He sailed as far up as the Depth of the Water would permit his Sloop to go, which was somewhere about *Albany*. This was the first Interourse we had with the *Confederates*†; First Inter-
Discovery of New-York.
course with the Confederates.
 the *Bear Tribe* of the *Caningas*, called *Maquas*, being then seated on the West, as the *Mobiccons*, a Nation not of the Confederacy, on the East Side of the *North-River* towards *Albany*. The *Mobiccons* occupied both Sides, from the *Kaats Kill* Mountains to the Sea, under several particular Names.

On *Hudson's* Return to *Holland*, some private Adventurers purchased the *East-India Company's* Right, and obtained of the States a Licence for an exclusive Trade. In 1610, they began a Commerce with the *Confederates*, who were then at War with all the Nations round; and by that Means incurred the Resentment of all the Tribes of *Mobiccons*. In 1613, they began a Trading-House at the Place now called *Albany*, and the following Year put some Cannon into it. But this they were compelled to abandon in 1618, without any Breach with the *Confederates*. From this to 1623, when the *West-India Company* obtained their Charter, they traded only at their Ships, without any Fort or Trading-House. Nor did the *West-India Company* attempt any Settlement till 1629.
Private Trades to Albany.
A Trading-House at Albany 1613, abandoned 1618.
West-India Company's Charter.
First Dutch Settlement in 1629.

From that Time to 1664, there was an uninterrupted Administration, under three successive Governor Generals, by Commission of the *West-India Company* of the Chamber of *Amsterdam*, under the Allegiance of the States General.
Thence to 1664 a regular Dutch Government.

Fort *Orange* was established almost as early as *New Amsterdam*. (The Names that the *Dutch* called *Albany* and *New-York* by.) For as the *French* from *Canada* had for several Years furnished the Enemies of the *Confederates* with Fire-Arms, the Trade with the *Dutch* could alone enable them to withstand their Enemies. On the other hand, the *Dutch* had all the other Nations round one Time or other at War with them. On these Points of joint Interest, was an inviolable Friendship established between the *Dutch* and the *Confederates*. But in no Case did the *Dutch* claim Land on *St. Laurence River*, or Dominion over the *Confederates*.
Albany second Settlement 1629. The Dutch and Confederates how connected.

In 1664, an *English Squadron*, without any Declaration of War, took *New-York* and its Dependencies, which extended Westward to within three
New-York taken by the English 1664.

† This Confederacy, called by the *French* *les Iroquois*, consisted then of five Nations, and is now of seven. From the Corruption of *Marquas*, first prolonged to *Mabaquas* by *Dom. Megapolensis*, and contracted again, we have formed the Name *Mobochs*, which we give now to the whole Nation of *Caningas*. This Confederacy is the same as the *Five Cantons* mentioned in the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

Confirmed by the Treaty of Breda 1667. Dutch Miles of *Delaware* River; and on the other Side, ten *English* Miles to the Eastward of *North-River*, by Capitulation the 16th of *September* 1664 §. This Province, which then obtained the Name of *NEW-YORK*, called by the *Dutch*, while in their Possession, *THE NEW NETHERLANDS*, was by the third Article of the Treaty of *Breda*, July 31, 1667, confirmed to the *English*, as *Surinam* was to the *Dutch*. This Article recites, 'That they should each respectively keep whatever Places they had taken by Force of Arms or otherwise, and were in Possession of the 20th of *May* foregoing.'*

French Treaty of Breda, At the Time that this Treaty was made with the *Dutch*, another was executed with the *French* at the same Place. By the second Article a General Peace was established. By the fourth, a Freedom of Commerce. And by the twelfth, express Mention is made of the Places that should be restored by the *French* to the Crown of *England*; that is, *Antegoa* and *Montserat*. And the *English* promised to restore whatever Places they had taken, and the *French* had been in Possession of, the 1st of *January* 1665 †. This I esteem equivalent to a Treaty of Confirmation; because if Places taken are to be restored, those not lost are to be implied to be confirmed, or at least it amounts to an Acquiescence of the other Party. The 1st of *January* 1665, the *English* had been in Possession of *New-York* near four Months, and had assumed to fulfil with the *Confederates* whatever had been engaged by the *Dutch*. And the *French* at the same Time had two or three considerable Townships on the South-east Side of *St. Laurence* River, and as many Sconces between *Montreal* and *Riviere St. Francis*. Upon this Point I found my Opinion of the *French's* extending thereabouts to this Side of *St. Laurence*. For those Parts have never been given to us by any subsequent Treaty. But Countries in the actual Possession of the *French* have been confirmed to them by the fourth Article of the Treaty of *Ryfwick*, and the *French* have had Possession of those Parts above 130 Years.

Charles II. secret Treaty. A secret Treaty followed with *France* in 1670, for the Destruction of the *Dutch*, and was put in Execution by a Declaration of War of King *Charles* II. against the *States*, *March* 27, 1672, while *Lewis* XIV. invaded the United Provinces with a vast Army and amazing Progress.

The first Establishment of the *French* at *Frontenac*. During this intimate Union of Purposes between the Crowns of *England* and *France*, and while the *French* were in Amity with the *Confederates*, Count *Frontenac*, Governor of *Canada* in 1672, prevailed with the *Confe-*

§ All the Dates here are reduced to the New Stile.

* N. B. There are two Commas [“”] prefixed to full Quotations, and one only to Extracts or Abridgements.

† 12. 'The most Christian King shall restore *Antegoa* and *Montserat*.' "And the King of *Great-Britain* shall reciprocally restore and give up to the most Christian King in the Form already expressed, all the Islands, Countries, Fortresses and Colonies, in what Part of the World soever they are situated, which he was in Possession of before the first of *January* 1665, and which might have been taken from him by the Arms of the King of *Great-Britain* before or after the signing of the present Treaty."

derates

derates to allow him to build a Trading-House at *Cataragui*; and under that Pretence he built a Fort, to which he gave his own Name *Frontenac* *. This is the Point in question.

The *Dutch*, though reduced to Extremities at home, had abroad a victorious Fleet under Admiral *Evertse*, junior, which destroyed near all the *French* and *English* Shipping from *Newfoundland* to *Barbadoes*; and in *August* 1673 surprized *New-York*, and held it without any Capitulation †. The Council of War extended Dominion only as far as the *Dutch* had formerly claimed ‡, and for that Purpose compelled the Magistrates and Officers within those Bounds to swear Allegiance to the *States*, and the serene Prince of *Orange*.

The *Dutch* retake *New-York* 1673.

The Extent of their Claim the same as formerly.

In Captain *Anthony Colve*'s Commission ||, which was given him by the Council of War for Governor General, the *Dutch* Boundaries are very circumstantially described where they bind on the *English*. But to the Northward no Boundary is mentioned. Upon this I found my Opinion that no Boundaries had ever been settled with the *French*, as they had been with the *English* at *Hartford* in 1650, on the Eastern Side.

The *Dutch* Boundaries in *Colve*'s Commission.

Our unnatural War with the *Dutch* was determined by the Treaty of *Westminster* the 10th of *February* 1674. By the sixth Article it was concluded, ' that whatever Countries, Towns, Forts, &c. had been taken on ' either Side since the Commencement of the War, should be restored to ' the former Lord and Proprietor.' The Country was restored to the *English* in Pursuance of this Treaty, *October* 31, 1674.

New-York restored to the *English* by the Treaty of *Westminster* 1674.

Though a Peace was concluded with *Holland*, *Charles II.* still remained devoted to *France*, and encouraged their Enterprizes. During the Remainder of this Reign the *English* were extremely serviceable to the *Confederates*, as they had got again insensibly engaged in a War with the *French*, by intercepting their Enemies as they came to trade at *Frontenac*.

Charles II. still in *French* Measures.

Though they have in *Europe* disputed about Dependency of the *Confederates* on the Crown of *England*, and whether they be Subjects or not, the same will not bear disputing in this City; where we know, that they are not subject to our Laws; that they have no Magistrates appointed over them by our King; that they have no Representatives in our Assemblies; that their own Consent is necessary to engage them in a War on our Side: but that they have the Power of Life and Death, Peace and War, in their Councils, without being accountable to us. Subjection is what they are unacquainted with, even in their own State, there being no such Thing as coercive Power among them. Their *Chiefs* are such only in Virtue of their

The Dependency of the *Confederates* in Regard to Subjection.

* *Colden's History of the Five Nations*, 8vo, p. 34. † *The Lives of the Dutch Sta-Heroes*, by V. D. B. p. 436. and *Dutch Records Z*, at *New-York*. ‡ *Dutch Records Z*. || *Idem*.

The Absurdity of sending BRITISH FORCES to VIRGINIA, answered.

Credit, and not their Power. They may indeed, with as much or greater Propriety, be said to be Subjects to the King of *Great Britain* as to their own Chiefs, because of their Dependence upon him for Protection, especially against the *French*.

They are under the Guardianship of the English.

'Skaniaderade in 1701 and the Countries of Senecas, &c. in 1726, surrendered to the English; and for what Uses.

Their Connection with us arises from the *French*, and most of their *Allies* being their and our common Enemy, and meditating their Destruction. After the *French* had, by Insinuation and Conquest, made great Encroachments upon them, they surrendered 'Skaniaderade, and the Habitations of the *Senecas*, *Cayugas*, and *Onondages*; from *Cayakoga* to *Oswego*, to the *English*: Not, I assure you, for our own Use, but to defend the said *Confederates*, their Heirs and Successors for ever. Therefore the *English* may be justly esteemed their *Guardians*; by no means their *Masters*. 'Skaniaderade was surrendered to the *English* the 30th of July 1710, two Years after they had submitted *Frontenac* to the *French*; lest the *French* should inroach beyond the little Lake at *Cataragui*, lying between *Frontenac* and *Kente*. This was confirmed September 25, 1726, when they surrendered the Habitations of the three Western Nations of the *Confederates* above mentioned. But to return to our Narrative.

Frontenac of Importance in an active War with the *Confederates*.

The *French* being involved in a War, kept *Frontenac*, as a very important Place in an active War with the *Confederates*; as being properly situated to rendezvous their Forces, when designed against them; and to intercept their Hunters as they returned from 'Skaniaderade by the East End of Lake *Ontario*; but no way fitted for the Defence of their Frontiers of *Canada*.

The War of the *French* and *Confederates*. The *Confederates* abandoned by James II by the Treaty of White Hall, 1686.

This War was at the highest, in the Reign of *James* the II. both Sides equally bent upon extirpating the other. This King, to abandon the *Confederates* to their Destiny, entered the 16th of November 1686, at *White-Hall*, into a Treaty of good Correspondence and Neutrality with the *French* for *America*. By the 1st Article it is agreed, 'That a firm Peace, Union and Amity, shall be between the *British* and *French* Nations in *America*. By the 2d, that the Soldiers, or others, of either Side shall not molest the other, nor shall give Assistance or Supplies of Men or Victuals to the barbarous or wild *Indians*, with whom the most Christian King, or the King of *Great Britain* shall have a War.' And by the 4th, "That both Kings shall have and retain to themselves, all the Dominions, Rights and Pre-eminences in the *American* Seas, Roads, and other Waters whatsoever, in as full and ample Manner, as of Right belongs to them; and in such Manner as they now possess the same.

The *French* Navigation confirmed.

French Right, tho' not an exclusive one to the Navigation of *L. Ontario*.

It is to be observed, that the *French* had at this Time two Barques on Lake *Ontario*; * and that they have not given up this Right by any

* Colden, p. 62. compared with p. 83,

Treaty since. But this is no exclusive Right; for the Confederates remained Masters of all the other Parts of the Lake. In the Year 167, *But not to* Mr. La Salle, in the Service of France, built a Barque above the Falls of Niagara, and navigated with her the Lakes of Erie, Huron, and Michigan. The Confederates burnt her in her return, and killed all the Men. By that Means, the French Navigation was prevented there, and from being included in this Article for those Lakes. Upon which I conclude, that the French have a Right by Treaty, though not an exclusive one, to the Navigation of Lake Ontario; none at all to Lake Erie, because entirely surrounded with the Country of the Confederates; which is our exclusive Right, as the far greater Part has been surrendered to us, for the Uses already mentioned, by the Confederates; and their whole Country, by the 15th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, the French acquiesce to be ours; and is so, as far as any Claim of theirs can extend. The Confederates Land extended a great Way on the Lakes Huron and Michigan, the adjacent Navigation must be ours for the same Reason. But as the other Parts of these two latter Lakes are bordered with Nations whom Commissioners were to determine, whether belonging to the French or English, which has not been done, the Right to the Navigation of the adjacent Parts of those Lakes, remains yet to settle.

The whole Navigation of Erie belongs to the English.

And Part of Huron and Michigan. The rest unsettled.

While the Treaty of Whitehall existed between the two Crowns, the Governor of Canada solicited the Confederates to enter into Treaty with him, for accommodating their Differences. This Colonel Dongan, Governor of New-York, endeavoured to frustrate; by insisting, that it would be more for the Interest of the Confederates, to treat with the French, as Dependants upon the Crown of England. But King James ordered the Governor to give up the Point††. Therefore whatever Pretence of Dominion the English might have had over the Confederates, here the King gave it up, for a Time at least.

The French propose an Accommodation with the Confederates. Col. Dongan's Advice.

King James II renounces Dominion over the Confederates.

War renewed, Montreal sacked.

The Negotiation proposed between the French and Confederates being frustrated, the War was renewed with greater Vigour. The Confederates in July 1688 sack'd great Part of the Island of Montreal; and in October following, completed what they had left before unfinished, except the City†. This obliged the French Garrison at Frontenac, to destroy the two Barques they had on Lake Ontario, and abandon the Fort at Cataraqui, by the Governor's Order*. But in their precipitate Flight, the Match they had left to blow up the Magazine and one of the Bastions missed its Effect. Fifty of the Confederates entered the Fort, where they found 28 Barrels of Powder, and other Stores, which they took away, and left the Fort a little damaged and empty §.

The French abandon Frontenac, 1688.

The Confederates enter it, and also leave it,

† Hennapin's Travels, Vol. 1. †† Colden's History, p. 85. † Colden's History, p. 88.
* Charlevoix, Letter 12. § Colden, p. 88.

Frontenac empty at the Revolution, and William and Mary's War.

The French reinstate themselves at Frontenac, 1689.

The Foundation of an Assertion of the Author in his Analysis.

The Fort Frontenac was thus abandoned by the French and the Indians; when the happy Revolution took place in England, in the Winter 1688, and remained so when Queen King and William Mary declared War against France the 17th of May 1689.

The Winter following, on the Removal of M. de Nonville from the Government of Canada, and the reinstating the Count Frontenac there; some young Gentlemen, and Indian Traders, went to Cataragui and established themselves in the Fort, repairing some little Damages the Indians had done†. From that Time, the French have continued in Possession of it to this Day. Upon account of this Re-entry by the French, I said in my Analysis, p. 14, that they attained the Possession of it during their War with the Confederates. As for the Possession they first had, by Consent of the Confederates, for a Trading-House, I have here shewn how they had lost it.

The French continued in Possession of Frontenac. Peace of Ryfwick, 1697. The 4th Article confirms the Dominions the Parties then held, to the Parties that held them.

For which Reason the Author concluded that Frontenac, &c. belonged to the French, who then held it.

The French thus reinstated at Fort Frontenac, during their Wars with the English and the Confederates, continued so, when the Treaty of Ryfwick was concluded between the King of Great Britain and the most Christian King, the 20th of September 1697. The 4th Article runs thus. "And since the most Christian King was never more desirous of any thing, than that the Peace be firm and inviolable, the said King promises and agrees for himself and his Successors, That he will on no Account whatsoever, disturb the said King of Great Britain, in the free Possession of the Kingdoms, Countries, Lands, or Dominions which he now enjoys; and therefore engages his Honour, upon the Faith and Word of a King, that he will not give or afford any Assistance, directly or indirectly, to any Enemy or Enemies of the said King of Great Britain: And that he will in no Manner whatsoever favour the Conspiracies or Plots which any Rebels, or ill-disposed Persons, may in any Place excite or contrive against the said King: And for that End promises and engages, That he will not assist with Arms, Ships, Ammunition, Provisions, or Money, or in any other Way, by Sea or Land, any Person or Persons, who shall hereafter, under any Pretence whatsoever, disturb or molest the said King of Great Britain, in the free and full Possession of his Kingdoms, Countries, Lands and Dominions. The King of Great Britain likewise promises and engages for himself and Successors, Kings of Great Britain, That he will inviolably do and perform the same towards the said most Christian King, his Kingdoms, Countries, Lands and Dominions". It was upon this Faith and Honour of King William's Promise of not disturbing the French King, in the free Possessions of the Kingdoms, Countries, Lands or Dominions he then enjoyed, that I said in my Analysis, The French had an undoubted Title to their Acquisition of the North-west Side of St. Laurence River, from Frontenac to

† Colden's History, p. 97, and 181. * From the London Copy published by Authority, 1697. Montreal.

Montreal. The *French*, by the Force of this Fort, having obliged the *Confederates* entirely to relinquish those Parts, whatever their Right was there before.

When Advice arrived in *America*, of the Peace being concluded at *Ryswick*, the Governors of *New-York* and *Canada* immediately ceased Hostilities: But to bring the *Confederates*, though now weary of the War, to be reconciled to the *French*, and their numerous *Allies*, was not so easily effected. The *French* wanted to treat with them separately, and the *English* to give Peace to the *French*, as if the *Confederates* were Subjects of *England*. This Point, after much Contest, was referred to their Principals at home, and by them to Commissioners to settle *. But the Governor of *Canada* improving this Pretension of the *English* to a Dominion over the *Confederates*, and representing that the *English* claimed them as *Slaves*, for they have no other Idea of *Subjection* than *Slavery*, they fell in with Count *Frontenac* in 1699, and concluded a separate Peace with the *French* †; and left Fort *Frontenac* and the Country thence to *Montreal* in Possession of the *French*, the War between them having been begun before, and continued after the *English* were engaged in it.

Advice of the Peace.
Doubts about the Depend-
ency of the Con-
federates, re-
ferred to Com-
missioners to
settle in Eu-
rope.
The *French*
and *Confede-
rates* conclude
a separate
Peace, 1699.
Frontenac is
left to the
French.

If the *Confederates* had granted the Country in question to the *English* before the *French* had settled it, which I have no Reason to believe they had, as they never made a Claim to it, or had Possession of it, the *English* had a Right to acquiesce with the *French*'s keeping it, as the *Kingdoms*, *Countries*, *Lands* or *Dominions*, which the most *Christian King* then enjoyed, as mentioned by the fourth Article of the Peace of *Ryswick* above quoted.

The *English*,
if they had a
Right to *Front-
tenac*, had a
Right to con-
firm it to the
French.

If the *Confederates* had not granted the Country to the *English* before the *French* had settled it, the *Confederates* had undoubtedly a Right to acquiesce with the *French*'s keeping it by the Treaty they concluded in 1699.

Otherwise the
Confederates
might confirm
it.

I have thus related the Circumstances which induced me to form the Opinion I published in my Analysis in Regard to the Right of the Country lying between Fort *Frontenac* and *Montreal*, on the North-west Side of *St. Laurence*. I am morally certain of every Circumstance I have related; if my Conclusions are wrong, I should be glad of seeing the Point set in a better Light.

The Conclu-
sion.

* *Colden's History*, p. 196, 197.

† *Idem* p. 199.

S E C T. II.

Remarks upon the Letter-Writer's Reasoning, &c.

The Letter-
Writer's Reasoning.

Quotes the
seventh Article of the
Treaty of
Ryswick.

I Have hitherto confined myself to rectifying some of the Letter-Writer's Representations of *Facts*; and the Reader, I hope, will pardon my spending one or two Paragraphs in disabusing the Public of some of his Reasoning and Insinuations. He says that, "All that the Treaty (of *Ryswick*) contains, that can be thought to be in the least Degree applicable to the Matter under Consideration, is the seventh Article, which is in these Words, *That the most Christian King shall restore to the King of Great Britain, all Countries, Islands, Ports and Colonies, wheresoever situated, which the English did possess before the Declaration of this present War: And in like Manner the King of Great Britain shall restore to the most Christian King, all Countries, Islands, Ports and Colonies, wheresoever situated, which the French did possess before the said Declaration of War; and this Restitution shall be made on both Sides within the Space of six Months, or sooner if it can be done.*" How he came to think this Article at all applicable to the Matter under Consideration, a Stranger would be at a Loss to know. In Answer, let it suffice, that the Public be informed, *That the English did not possess the Land in question before the Declaration of the War determined by the Peace of Ryswick*; and therefore it could not be included in this Article. So far otherwise, the *French did possess it before the Declaration of that War*; and had we taken it, we must have made a Restitution of it to them, in Pursuance of the Article the Letter-Writer has quoted.

As for the Author's Insinuations that some out of Principle, and some out of evil Designs, who would gladly improve my Map to serve a *French* Interest, may refuse to be concerned the next Campaign in an Attempt upon *Frontenac*, a careful Perusal of the foregoing Articles will best answer.

The Letter-Writer repeats here, what has been confuted over and over in regard to the Assembly of *Pensilvania*. "That not long since a very respectable Body, unacquainted with his Majesty's Rights in *America*, or influenced by false geographical Representations, seemed in Answer to a Message of one of our Governors, to doubt the Equity of our Claim to the very Lands on the *Ohio*, which even Mr. *Evan's himself* has included in the Province of *Pensilvania*." The Assembly never called in question his Majesty's Right to any Part of the *Ohio*: They did indeed doubt, whether Fort *Duquesne* was in the Province of *Pensilvania*, as the Governor insisted it was, and brought such Evidence to prove as the Nature of the Subject would admit. The Place was remote; later Scrutiny shews only, that it was but just within the Borders. The Dispute about that Fort's being in the Colony, was introduced with a View of getting the Assembly

sembly to act as Principals in the Recovery of it. Had the Governors been anxious only for removing the Encroachments, it would have availed little, whether Fort Duquesne was in or out of the Colony; or whether the Assembly acted as Principals or Auxiliaries, carried on a War themselves, or only contributed what they had in their Power to the Support of the other Expeditions carried on in his Majesty's Name in *New-Scotia, Lake George and Virginia.*

The Letter-Writer represents, "That the intestine Enemies of the Government, and all those who are disaffected to the present glorious and vigorous Measures of the Ministry, would not fail to make the worst Use of our Author's Doctrine in *Great Britain and Ireland.*" Is the Letter-Writer no better acquainted with the Measures proposed by the Ministry, than to think his Majesty's Forces were intended to go a Bird-nesting to *Canada*, while the *French* are settling and improving *Ohio*? The Ministry we know have directed the whole Plan of Action for the Recovery of *Ohio*. *Braddock* fell in the Attempt; we feel the fatal Loss: Had he been successful, the War had been probably over, and we in Possession of the finest Country on Earth. The Country is worth ten thousand Attempts. Not one who loves the Name of a *Briton, Liberty*, or of *GEORGE*, but would rejoice in an Opportunity of another Attempt. Is a Country incontestibly ours, capable of maintaining, with moderate Cultivation, fifty Millions of People at a Time, and those renewed every Generation, to be thrown away for the sake of taking *Frontenac*! Madneſs. To let ſo many People be the Descendents of *Frenchmen*, and not of *Britons*, the Sons of Slavery and not of Liberty, would be making a Waste of the most excellent Country that God ever created.

The Letter-Writer imputes to the Ministry Measures they never directed. The same answered.

New-York, Jan. 10, 1756.

LEWIS EVANS.